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Abstract: Hierarchies in social identities have been found to be integrally related to 
divergences in economic status. In India, caste is one such significant social identity where 
continued discriminatory practices towards the lower castes have resulted in poor outcomes 
for them. While there is considerable work on such divergence on many economic outcomes 
along caste lines, there is no work on behavioral preferences and personality traits that can 
also be adversely affected by such identity hierarchies, and that are important determinants of 
educational attainments and labor market performances. We combine rich data from 
incentivized tasks and surveys conducted among a large sample of university students in a 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression framework and find that the historically marginalized 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCSTs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) fare 
worse than the upper castes along several dimensions of economic behavior such as 
competitiveness and confidence and personality traits such as grit, locus of control, and 
conscientiousness. Further, we find that parental investments only have limited compensatory 
effects on these gaps. This suggests a need for redesigning the structure of affirmative action 
policies in India as well as targeting interventions with an aim to improving soft skills among 
the disadvantaged. 
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1. Introduction  
Hierarchies in social identities are often found to be highly correlated with corresponding 
inter-group differences in economic and social outcomes. On average, historically 
marginalized and discriminated groups, perform worse on typical indicators of achievement 
and well-being compared to individuals from high-ranking social groups. This divergence 
prevails across different constructs of social identities such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender 
and caste (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). The work on internalization of social stereotypes 
suggests that this is a rather complicated problem. Especially when there is a yawning social 
divide along racial, ethnic, religious or gender lines, adherence to choices that confirm 
identity stereotypes can influence and restrict choices of minority groups detrimentally, 
fostering dominated and sub-optimal outcomes (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Coate and 
Loury, 1993). Consequently, there is a vicious circle between hierarchical social structures 
accompanied by legacies of discrimination and stigma and poor self-valuations due to 
internalization of negative stereotypes resulting in a perpetuation of adverse outcomes (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1986; Major and O’Brien, 2005).  
 
This paper contributes broadly to the literature on discrimination and social identity by 
documenting gaps in behavioral traits and personality among historically well-defined social 
groups, drawing evidence from a developing country. More specifically, we examine caste 
gaps on a range of experimentally elicited behavioral preferences (such as competitiveness, 
confidence, risk preferences, and egalitarianism), and socioemotional traits (including Big 
Five traits, locus of control, and grit), among a large sample of university students in India. 
These dimensions become especially important in light of current work on the determinants 
of labor market performances. Recent research shows that labor market outcomes are not just 
explained by variations in cognitive skills but also influenced by socioemotional traits (e.g., 
Almlund et al., 2011; Deming, 2017; Roy et al., 2018). Unfortunately, internalization of 
negative self-images has the potential to detrimentally influence exactly such characteristics.  
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The Indian caste system provides a particularly relevant context for studying the issue, as it is 
a deeply entrenched and enduring cultural institution.1 Caste is intricately linked to one’s 
economic and social outcomes in India. The lower castes – former  untouchables (Scheduled 
Castes, SCs hereafter) – and indigenous tribes (Scheduled Tribes, STs hereafter) have fared 
worse than the upper castes in terms of educational and occupational attainment (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig, 2006), wages and consumption (Kijima, 2006; Hnatkovska et al., 2012), and 
business ownership (Deshpande and Sharma, 2013 and 2016). Although affirmative action 
instituted for SCs and STs in 1950 in the form of reservations in national and state 
legislatures, local governments, institutions of higher education and government jobs has had 
positive impacts in poverty reduction, educational attainment and public goods provision 
(e.g., Pande, 2003; Chin and Prakash, 2011; Cassan, 2019), significant gaps still remain 
between SCSTs and non-SCSTs, and they continue to be subjected to violence by upper 
castes (Sharma, 2015).  
 
Further, the stigma associated with being low caste means that individuals are not viewed 
based on their own merits, but rather through the lens of their collective stigmatized caste 
identity (Shah et al., 2006). Therefore, it is plausible that social exclusion and repeated 
exposure to such discrimination and differential treatment may affect one’s beliefs, 
perceptions and aspirations.2 However, there is no evidence on how these caste groups differ 
 
1 The caste system is an arrangement of the Hindu population into several thousand groups called ‘jatis’ 
(castes). These groups have emerged from the ancient ‘varna’ system according to which society was divided 
into initially four, later five, hereditary, endogamous, mutually exclusive and occupation-specific groups. At the 
top of the varna system were the ‘Brahmins’ (priests and teachers) and the ‘Kshatriyas’ (warriors and royalty), 
followed by ‘Vaishyas’ (merchants and moneylenders) and finally the ‘Shudras’ (engaged in lowliest jobs). 
Over time, the Shudras split into two tiers, with those engaged in the most menial jobs being called the ‘Ati-
Shudras’. The Ati-Shudras (Dalits) were considered untouchable and any contact with them was considered 
polluting. Additionally, there are the indigenous tribes (or the Adivasis) who due to geographical isolation, 
primitive agricultural practices and distinct social customs face large-scale exclusion from mainstream society. 
In 1950, the Indian Constitution extended affirmative action to Dalits and Adivasis (officially termed as 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively). In addition, there is a third category known as the ‘Other 
Backward Classes’ (OBCs). While OBCs are not historically stigmatized like the SCs and STs, they are 
described as a socially and educationally backward group. Reservations have been extended to OBCs since the 
early 1990s and remain an intensely debated issue. Deshpande (2011) provides an overview of the caste system 
in India. 
2 Indeed, recent theoretical work by Genicot and Ray (2017) and Dalton et al. (2016) shows that aspirations 
affect effort and the incentives to invest, and these are determined both by personal and societal factors. 
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along important dimensions of behavioral preferences and socioemotional traits where the 
latter capture perceptions related to ‘self’ and ‘identity’ more broadly.  
 
We use a Seemingly Unrelated Regression framework to examine caste gaps on a range of 
experimentally elicited behavioral preferences (competitiveness, confidence, risk 
preferences, and egalitarianism), and personality traits (Big Five traits, locus of control, and 
grit) among college students in a large Indian university.3 In addition, we evaluate the role of 
family investments as one of the possible avenues of mitigating some of the elicited 
differences. We present findings from a unique dataset of approximately 2,000 college 
students. These data collect novel information on a variety of behavioral and personality 
traits that are rarely found in large-scale datasets in developing countries and are non-existent 
especially along the caste dimension.  
 
Our results are striking and reveal the depth of cumulative effects of years of discrimination 
along caste lines in India. We find that in almost all reported measures of socioemotional and 
behavioral preferences, there exists a considerable gap between the discriminated SCST, 
OBCs and the upper castes. Subjects belonging to the lower caste groups not only express 
lower willingness to compete and less confidence, they also exhibit lower scores on 
grittiness, locus of control, and Big Five measures of conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and openness to experience. However, they exhibit more egalitarian choices 
in areas of social preferences. These results are robust to corrections for multiple hypotheses 
testing and checks for the presence of unobservables in explaining our effects. Our finding 
that low caste students evaluate themselves lower on personality traits can/may have 
important implications for their academic achievement and labor market success.  
 
Our research findings add to the important literature on social identity and preferences. For 
example, Benjamin et al. (2010) find that making Asian-American and native black subjects’ 
ethnicity salient causes them to become more patient. Hoff and Pandey (2006) find that 
revealing subjects’ caste affiliation in Indian villages adversely affects performance on a  
3 The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) framework allows for subject choices to be correlated across the 
different decision domains that we investigate. 
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cognitive task and reduces willingness to compete among low castes in the presence of upper 
caste members. Bros (2014), using the World Values Survey, finds that even after controlling 
for income, education, and occupation, SC and ST respondents are more likely to believe that 
they belong to lower social ranks as compared to their upper caste counterparts. Deshpande 
and Newman (2007) find low caste university students to have lower occupational and wage 
expectations than their upper caste counterparts. In a within-village analysis, Spears (2016) 
finds that SCSTs and OBCs report lower life satisfaction compared to the upper castes, and 
the difference cannot be fully explained by caste differences in wealth and education. Our 
results using the lens of endogenized caste identity add an important avenue for explaining 
the continued differences in welfare outcomes along caste lines.  
 
Importantly, from a policy point of view, our findings speak to the literature on early-life 
circumstances in developing one’s personality and preferences (e.g., Fletcher and Wolfe, 
2016; Falk et al., 2019). Children from minority groups are deprived not just because of their 
poorer socioeconomic status but also because they tend to grow up in environments that are 
mostly characterized by low parental human capital and lack of social support. Our student 
sample provides heterogeneity in terms of family background thereby allowing us to explore 
whether better socioeconomic status alleviates some of the disadvantages of belonging to 
lower castes. Our results inform that higher socioeconomic status and attendance at a private 
high school do have some compensatory effects for low castes but only on a small subset of 
the personality traits. This suggests that parental investments are not sufficient, and there is 
an urgent need for redesigning the current structure of affirmative action policies. There 
needs to be a focus on more interventions targeted at an early age to mitigate the long-term 
consequences of being born into a lower caste family that are observed in our results. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the study context and the data, 
and Section 3 lays out the estimation framework. Summary statistics, regression results, 
robustness are presented, and the role of socioeconomic status is examined in Section 4. 




2. Context and Data 
2.1 Context 
 
We conducted our study with undergraduate students enrolled in University of Delhi (DU). 
DU is one of India’s top public universities that offer three-year undergraduate education to 
approximately 160,000 full-time students. DU consists of 79 colleges, each offering degrees 
in multiple disciplines such as science, commerce, arts, and humanities. College admissions 
for most disciplines in DU are based on cutoffs such that applicants whose high school exit 
exam scores exceed the cutoff are eligible to take admission in the college-discipline.  
 
In line with the Indian affirmative action policy of reservations (‘quotas’) in higher education 
institutions, DU reserves 15 percent and 7.5 percent of seats for applicants belonging to the 
SC and ST categories respectively, and the admission cutoffs are lower for these groups by 
5-15 percent. Further, 27 percent of seats are also reserved for Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs) and the cutoffs can be up to 10 percent lower than those for non-reserved applicants. 
However, only students with household income below a certain threshold (‘non-creamy 
layer’) among OBCs are eligible to take admission through the affirmative action policy.4  
 
Recent empirical evaluations find that affirmative action has increased the representation of 
the targeted groups in higher education and had downstream positive impacts on their 
educational attainment (e.g., Cassan, 2019; Desai and Kulkarni, 2008). However, several 
accounts reveal that higher education institutions are exclusionary in nature and students 
from reserved groups experience discrimination at the hands of their upper caste peers and 
teachers based on their caste and stigmatizing attitudes remain prevalent (Ovichegan, 2014; 
Deshpande, 2019). Therefore, the university environment reinforces the underlying causes of 
marginalization. Further, reports show that elite universities like DU are not immune to these 
concerns.5   
  
4 Applicants must provide validated caste certificates to be eligible to apply through these reserved categories.  




In 2014, we conducted a series of incentivized experiments among a large sample of 
approximately 2,000 college students enrolled in undergraduate programs across fifteen 
colleges in DU.6 This was followed by a short socioeconomic survey that captures student’s 
demographic characteristics and socioemotional traits.  
 
Subjects’ preferences for competitiveness and confidence were elicited using a competition 
task adapted from Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Subjects participated in a real-effort task 
that involved adding up four two-digit numbers where they were asked to predict their 
performances after a practice round, and choose between a piece-rate and tournament 
compensation scheme. The piece-rate scheme paid INR 10 for every correct answer; the 
tournament scheme paid double that amount for every correct answer if the subject out-
performed a randomly selected student of DU who had solved the questions earlier.7 We 
define competitiveness as a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the subject chose the 
tournament compensation scheme and 0 if the subject chose the piece-rate compensation 
scheme. We define confidence as a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the subject 
believed that her performance in the actual task would exceed those of others in the 
university, 0 otherwise.  
 
Distributional preferences were measured using the Bartling et al. (2009) framework that 
asks subjects to state their preferences over a series of four binary distributional choices that 
would affect their and an anonymous participant’s earnings. In all four choices, option A is 
an equal distribution and option B is an unequal distribution. We define egalitarianism as a 
dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the subject chooses the equal division (option A) in 
each row, 0 otherwise.  
Lastly, we used the investment task of Gneezy and Potters (1997) to elicit risk attitudes. 
Subjects had to invest a portion of their endowment of INR 150 in a risky lottery (with equal  
6  The experiment instructions and the survey instruments are available from the authors upon request. Details 
related to sampling are available in Dasgupta et al. (2017).  
7 We implemented a pilot version of this game where forty students from DU had participated, and their 
performance is used for comparison in the tournament wage scheme.  
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chance of win or loss) and set aside the remainder. If the investment was successful (based 
on a roll of a dice) subjects received triple the invested amount in addition to any amount 
they set aside. If they lost the lottery, they only received the amount that was set aside. We 
define risk preference as the proportion allocated to the risky lottery in the investment task 
with higher invested amounts indicating lower risk aversion. 
Following the completion of the incentivized experiments, as part of the socioeconomic 
survey, we administered standard inventories to measure socioemotional traits such as Big 
Five personality traits, locus of control, and grit. The Big Five personality traits were 
measured using the 10-item inventory of Gosling et al. (2003) where each item has a score 
between 1 (disagree strongly) and 7 (agree strongly). The Big Five traits are defined as 
follows: Openness to experience is the tendency to be open to new aesthetic, cultural, or 
intellectual experiences; Conscientiousness refers to a tendency to be organized, responsible, 
and hardworking; Extraversion relates to an outward orientation rather than being reserved; 
Agreeableness is related to the tendency to act in a cooperative and unselfish manner; and 
Emotional Stability (opposite of Neuroticism) is predictability and consistency in emotional 
reactions with absence of rapid mood changes. Additionally, we implemented the 8-item Grit 
scale of Duckworth and Quinn (2009) where a higher score on the Grit scale implies greater 
ability to pursue long-term goals with sustained effort. Finally, Locus of control was 
measured using 13 items from Rotter (1966). Subjects with a high score exhibit an internal 
locus of control indicating that they believe that events in life are more under their control as 
compared to those with an external locus of control who believe that their outcomes are 
determined by luck and other factors. We standardize all personality traits using the sample 
mean and standard deviation and use z-score constructs of these variables in the regression 
analyses. As part of the survey, we also collected details on characteristics such as caste, 
religion, type of high school attended, and family socioeconomic status.  
The outcomes we measure capture notions of one’s preferences and beliefs and have 
meaningful implications for performance in education and labor market domains. For 
instance, competitiveness can explain gender gaps in academic track choice, job entry 
decisions, and wages (Buser et al., 2014; Flory et al., 2015). Risk preferences have 
implications for skill accumulation and selection into entrepreneurship (Dasgupta et al., 
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2015). Those with an internal locus of control perceive the subjective returns to effort and 
investment to be higher, and this explains the positive relationship between locus of control 
and investments in education, job search, and health behaviors as well as entrepreneurial 
performance (Cobb-Clark, 2015; Sharma and Tarp, 2018).   
Overall, we conducted 60 sessions with over 2,000 subjects, resulting in approximately 35 
subjects per session. No feedback was provided between or after the experimental tasks. 
Each session lasted about 75 minutes. All subjects received a show-up fee of INR 150. The 
average additional payment was INR 230.8 All subjects participated only once in the study. 
To minimize wealth effects, additional payments were based on a randomly selected 
incentivized task. 
3. Estimation Strategy 
As each subject makes choices in the three incentivized tasks and also scores him/herself on 
eight personality traits as described in Section 2.2, we estimate these equations using a 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) framework that allows for these choices to be 
correlated. We report the correlation between the error terms obtained from estimating each 
of the behavioral preferences and personality traits separately using OLS (see Tables A1 and 
A2 in the online Appendix). We can reject the null that the outcomes are independent for the 
vector of elicited behavioral preferences and personality traits (p-value < 0.01). This supports 
our choice of estimating the following SUR model that allows the errors to be correlated 
across equations, thereby improving the precision of the estimates, and also reducing Type II 
error, i.e., the risk of attaining low statistical power.  
 
We estimate the following: 




where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the dependent variable (behavioral preferences and personality traits) observed 
for individual i and outcome j, SCST is a dummy that takes a value 1 if the subject belongs to  
8 At the time of conducting the study, the exchange rate was USD 1= INR 60. 
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the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe group, 0 otherwise. OBC is a dummy that takes a 
value 1 if the subject belongs to the Other Backward Classes, 0 otherwise. X is a vector of 
family background characteristics and demographic characteristics that are included in all 
specifications, such as age (in years), male (takes a value 1 if male, 0 if female), Hindu (takes 
value 1 if belonging to Hindu religion, 0 otherwise), private school (takes a value 1 if the 
individual was enrolled in a private high school, 0 otherwise), high socioeconomic status 
(takes a value 1 if both parents have at least a college degree or if monthly family income 
exceeds INR 50,000, and 0 otherwise), and standardized Raven’s test score as a measure of 
‘fluid intelligence’. We also include session fixed effects (ϑs), which among other things, 
control for differences in caste and gender composition across sessions. 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the iid error 
term.  
4. Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics  
Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation for our outcome and control variables, for 
the pooled sample and also by caste. Panel A summarizes the behavioral preferences. In our 
sample, 31 percent of the subjects chose the competitive remuneration by deciding to enter 
the tournament, and we observe no caste differences in willingness to compete. About a third 
of our sample is confident, in that they expect themselves to perform better than other 
students in the university. OBCs are significantly more confident than the upper castes and 
SCSTs. Subjects on average invest about 47 percent of their endowment in the risky asset; 
upper castes invest the smallest proportion of their endowment in the risky asset. Subjects’ 
preferences for equality also differ significantly by caste: lowest among upper caste (13 
percent) and almost similar among SCSTs (18 percent) and OBCs (19 percent).  
[Table 1 here] 
As seen in Panel B, in general, we observe some caste differences in all personality traits 
except emotional stability. Upper caste subjects score themselves higher on scales of 
extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience, and grit relative to OBCs and SCSTs. 




Background characteristics of our sample are reported in Panel C. As expected, and in line 
with the literature, upper caste subjects are significantly more likely than OBCs and SCSTs 
to have attended a private high school, and to belong to high SES families. We also find that 
the OBCs perform significantly better than SCST on indicators of family SES and private 
school attendance. This is in line with existing evidence that finds that the socioeconomic 
characteristics of OBCs lie somewhere in between those of upper castes and SCSTs 
(Deshpande and Ramachandran, 2019). We find a significant upper caste advantage in 
cognitive ability as measured by the Raven’s test. 
 
4.2 Regression Results 
We first present caste gaps in behavioral preferences, namely, competitiveness, confidence, 
risk preferences, and egalitarianism in Table 2 using the SUR framework proposed in the 
Section 3. Our main coefficients of interest in these regressions are the caste dummies: SCST 
and OBC, with upper caste serving as the reference group. SCSTs and OBCs are 8.7 
percentage points and 7.9 percentage points less likely respectively to compete than the 
upper castes. The SCSTs are also 7.2 percentage points less likely to be confident. However, 
we do not find a significant difference between the confidence levels of the OBCs and upper 
castes. Risk preferences of SCSTs and OBCs do not differ significantly from those of upper 
castes. While SCSTs are significantly less confident than OBCs, there are no OBC-SCST 
differences in terms of competitiveness or risk preferences (see bottom panel of Table 2). 
Our findings on competition are in line with Hoff and Pandey (2006) who find that revealing 
subjects’ caste affiliation in Indian villages reduces willingness to compete among low castes 
in the presence of upper caste members. 
 
Interestingly, SCSTs and OBCs are 5-7 percentage points more likely to prefer an equitable 
distribution compared to the upper castes, with no caste difference in choices between SCSTs 
and OBCs. This is in line with the Alesina and Giuliano (2011) who find blacks to be more 
supportive of redistributive policies as compared to whites in USA. There are two possible 
explanations for our finding. First, SCSTs and OBCs in our sample, and in general, belong to 
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the lower socioeconomic strata of society, which could lead them to have stronger 
preferences for income redistribution. Second, since the low caste groups have been 
beneficiaries of various welfare and affirmative action policies of the government, they may 
be more inclined to favor an equitable distribution. In fact, in our sample, most of the SCST 
and OBC subjects in the sample have availed the affirmative action policy to gain admission 
into the university. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
The coefficient estimates on the other covariates are in the expected directions. For example, 
females in our sample are less likely to compete, less confident, and more risk averse; and 
subjects with higher cognitive ability (as measured by Raven’s test score) are less risk averse.  
 
Next, in Table 3, we examine caste gaps in personality traits. Except for emotional stability 
for which there are no caste differences, we find SCSTs score themselves lower on all other 
traits such as agreeableness, openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, locus 
of control as well as grit. While the OBCs are also report lower grit, more introversion, and 
less openness to experience, they do not differ from the upper castes on other reported 
measures such as locus of control, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. 
Further, we find the OBC-SCST difference to be significant only for conscientiousness and 
locus of control and weakly significant for agreeableness. Given the importance of traits such 
as conscientiousness and locus of control in explaining labor market performance (Almlund 
et al., 2011), the wage and occupational disadvantage faced by SCSTs could be magnified 
due to a lower ratings/scores on such traits. For example, Borghans et al. (2014) argue that a 
stagnation of the black-white wage gap in the US may have been due to the increasing 
relevance of ‘people skills’ where minority groups may be at a disadvantage when interacting 
with the majority because of prejudice or barriers to interpersonal communication because of 
racial or cultural differences.  
[Table 3 here] 
In terms of other covariates, we find females to be more agreeable, more extrovert, and less 
emotionally stable, as also shown in the existing literature (Costa et al., 2001). Females in 
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our sample are also grittier and more conscientious. This is also reflected in other dimensions 
such as a significant gender difference in class attendance rates in our sample where we find 
that the proportion of female students attending classes regularly is 73 percent as compared 
to 64 percent among males (two-sided t-test, p-value < 0.001). 
 
4.3 The Role of Socioeconomic Status 
 
Our results thus far indicate that SCSTs and OBCs are at a disadvantage when it comes to 
behavioral preferences and ratings on personality traits, and they continue to suffer from 
historical and cultural discrimination. At the same time, there is evidence of significant 
catch-up experienced by SCSTs over the last few decades in terms of occupation, wages, 
consumption, and education in India (Hnatkovska et al., 2012). An immediate question of 
policy interest then is the scope of improved parental socioeconomic status (SES) in 
mitigating some of the observed behavioral caste gaps in our sample. For example, Falk et al. 
(2019) find that children from richer families and with highly educated parents are 
significantly more patient, less risk-seeking, and have higher IQ. Using a US panel data of 
school-age children, Fletcher and Wolfe (2016) find family income to be an important 
determinant of non-cognitive skills with the disadvantages associated with low income 
increasing over time. Therefore, exploring whether the caste effects vary by one’s SES 
constitutes a natural corollary to the above discussion.  
 
To examine this, in Tables 4 and 5, we estimate the SUR models for behavior and personality 
respectively, wherein the SCST and OBC variables are now interacted with a dummy for 
high SES. As seen in Table 1, while 82 percent of upper castes as classified as high SES, the 
corresponding numbers for OBCs and SCSTs are 42 percent and 37 percent respectively. 
Due to small overlap between low caste and high SES we do not find much role for SES 
except we find that among behavioral preferences, high SES OBCs are less egalitarian than 
OBCs from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. And among the personality traits, we find 
that OBCs from high SES backgrounds have a more internal locus of control as compared to 
OBCs from less well-off families. This partial compensating effect is particularly interesting 
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in light of the finding that locus of control is a robust determinant of life outcomes (Cobb-
Clark, 2015). Further, high SES SCSTs are less extroverted than low SES SCSTs.  
 
[Tables 4 and 5 here] 
Next, in Tables 6 and 7, we examine if one’s attendance in a private high school prior to 
joining university helps alleviate some of the observed caste gaps in behavior and 
personality. Private schools are typically characterized by higher teacher-student ratios, 
lower teacher absenteeism, and generally better infrastructure as compared to public schools 
in India. Muralidharan and Sundaraman (2015) find that private schools lead to better 
learning outcomes with more efficient time use and at a lower average cost per student as 
compared to public schools in a large Indian state. Therefore, relative to public schools, 
private schools may also shape behavioral attitudes and personality traits of students 
differently, thereby bridging some of the pre-existing caste gaps documented earlier. 
 
[Tables 6 and 7 here] 
For behavioral preferences, we do not find the caste effects to differ by the type of high 
school attended. However, attending a private school has compensatory effects on some 
personality traits. Although in the overall sample we do not find any caste differences in 
terms of emotional stability, SCSTs who attended private school are more emotionally stable 
than those who did not. SCSTs that attended private school are relatively more agreeable 
than those that did not. Similarly, OBCs that attended private school are more conscientious 
and express greater openness to experiences compared to OBCs that went to a public school. 
These results suggest that access to better environments in private schools could potentially 
foster a healthier development of some personality traits among low caste groups.  
 
We also examine whether these caste-based differences in traits and behavior differ by 





4.4 Robustness Checks 
In this sub-section we show that our primary results reported in Section 4.2 are robust to 
several checks. First, SUR models require information on all outcome variables and 
explanatory variables to be jointly not missing, thereby creating some extra missing 
observations. Therefore, we also estimate OLS/linear probability model regressions and find 
that the OLS estimates reported in online Appendix Tables A5 and A6 with more 
observations are quite similar to the corresponding SUR results (reported in Tables 2 and 3), 
ruling out any concerns related to missing data.9 
Second, in the event of multiple null hypotheses being tested, the probability of a false 
rejection (i.e., Type I error) could be higher than desired. To minimize this error, it is 
important to consider the multiplicity of null hypotheses being tested. We use the method 
outlined in Anderson (2008) to correct the standard errors for multiple hypotheses. As these 
corrections can only account for binary treatment indicators, we construct a binary variable 
low caste that takes the value 1 if the subject belongs to SCST or OBC category, and 0 if 
upper caste. In Tables A7 and A8 of the online Appendix we present OLS estimates for 
behavioral preferences and personality traits regressed on low caste and other controls 
respectively, along with unadjusted outcome-specific p-values and sharpened q-values 
derived using the multiple hypotheses correction.10 Our results are robust to this correction 
with a minor loss in the level of significance.  
Finally, we also check for the possibility that selection on unobservables may be biasing our 
coefficient estimates on the low caste variable. Using the test of Oster (2019), in the lower 
panels of Tables A7 and A8 of the online Appendix, we report the ratio of selection on 
unobservables to selection on observables (G) required to eliminate the caste effect, i.e., to 
attribute the entire caste effect to selection bias, and the bias-adjusted treatment effect (E*). 
 
9 Less than 1 percent of choices are missing for the behavioral preferences, except egalitarianism for which 1.5 
percent of the observations are missing. Less than 5 percent of the Big Five traits and grit are missing. About 7 
percent of the data on locus of control is missing. And 1-2 percent of the data on all other covariates is missing. 
10 The coefficient on the low caste variable is significant in all regressions where SCST and OBC variables were 
also independently significant.  
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We report these for the outcomes where the coefficient on caste is significant.11 The absolute 
value of G exceeds the prescribed cutoff value of 1 implying that selection on unobservables 
would have to exceed the selection on observables, which is unlikely. Further, assuming that 
unobservables matter as much as observables, the bias-adjusted treatment effects are similar 
to the coefficients in the controlled regressions. These statistics rule out the concern that 
unobservables may be driving our results. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine caste-based differences in behavioral preferences and personality 
traits. We find that SCSTs and OBCs fare worse compared to the upper castes along critical 
dimensions of behavior and personality that are associated with improvements in educational 
attainment, labor market performance, and life outcomes in general. Further, as our 
heterogeneity analyses show, a higher socioeconomic status or attendance in a private high 
school does not mitigate most of these behavioral caste gaps. This supports conclusions in 
other studies that a very large improvement in wealth status is needed to possibly overcome 
some of the negative self-perceptions that lower caste members harbor (Bros, 2014). While 
our sample is limited to students of one university, our findings are noteworthy in that we 
observe large caste-based differences even among students from largely urban backgrounds 
at an elite university. Moreover, this is consistent with overall patterns documented by the 
existing literature – that draws upon samples of varying representativeness from around the 
world – wherein minority groups tend to express lower subjective well-being due to their 
identity.  
 
Given that racial gaps in cognitive and socioemotional skills emerge even before children 
reach school-going age and tend to persist thereafter, there is a compelling case for targeting 
early childhood interventions to supplement the familial resources for children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. Cunha and Heckman (2007) suggest a similar approach when 
they discuss that the highest returns to low-ability disadvantaged groups accrue from early 
childhood programs as compared to those only in late adolescence. They further stress the  
11 For this test, we set maximum R-squared (Rmax) at 1.3 times the R-squared from the regressions using 
controls.  
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importance of following up on early childhood investments with complementary investments 
in later ages to reap the benefits of the former (dynamic complementarity). This suggests a 
critical need for rethinking the juncture where intervention is needed. Currently, the earliest 
that members of low caste can avail the benefits of affirmative action is at time of entry into 
higher education or employment in the public sector, by which time these preferences and 
traits are potentially less malleable. Consequently, our results indicate the urgent need to 
invest in programs that directly target the development of soft skills among disadvantaged 
individuals during their childhood and adolescence.  
 
Further, while affirmative action policies have been beneficial for targeted populations in 
many ways, such policies may also have unintended perverse consequences by generating 
stereotypes about incompetence about beneficiaries and reinforcing negative self-image 
(Bros, 2014; Deshpande, 2019; Leslie et al., 2014). Our work suggests that effects of 
affirmative action policies on socioemotional outcomes requires further research. 
 
At a broader level, there is also a case for using evidence from social psychology to foster 
greater inter-caste contact that can help reduce biases and negative stereotypes, which have 
repercussions on self-confidence and self-esteem among low castes (e.g., Lowe 2019). More 
concerted multi-pronged policy efforts towards making public spaces inclusive and 
facilitating interaction on equitable terms would be a start in this direction.  
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Sample size 2045 1433 325 287    
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. In Columns 5, 6, and 7, we report the p-value from a two-sided t-test comparing 
upper castes (UCs) to OBCs, upper castes to SCSTs, and OBCs to SCSTs respectively. In Panel B, the maximum possible 
score for the Big Five traits, locus of control, and grit is 7, 13, and 8 respectively. In Panel C, the maximum score for 
Raven’s test is 10. High socioeconomic status takes a value 1 if both parents have at least a college degree or if monthly 
family income exceeds INR 50,000, and 0 otherwise. Hindu takes value 1 if belonging to Hindu religion, 0 otherwise. 




Table 2: SUR Estimates: Behavioral Preferences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Competitiveness Confidence Risk Preference Egalitarianism 
     
SCST -0.087** -0.072* 0.367 0.065** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (1.482) (0.029) 
OBC -0.079** 0.029 0.136 0.055** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (1.329) (0.026) 
Female -0.171*** -0.099*** -6.285*** 0.006 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.904) (0.017) 
Age -0.002 0.004 0.210 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.507) (0.010) 
Hindu -0.055 0.008 -1.341 -0.027 
 (0.036) (0.037) (1.473) (0.028) 
Private School -0.053** -0.026 1.240 0.062*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (1.082) (0.021) 
High socioeconomic status 0.029 -0.007 0.248 -0.030 
 (0.026) (0.027) (1.081) (0.021) 
Raven’s test score 0.010 0.009 1.217*** -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.448) (0.009) 
Constant 0.660** 0.378 49.619*** 0.279 
 (0.264) (0.272) (10.878) (0.209) 
     
H0:  SCST = OBC  
(p-value) 0.04 (0.84) 6.32 (0.01) 0.02 (0.88) 0.11 (0.74) 
Observations 1,918 1,918 1,918 1,918 
R-squared 0.106 0.063 0.080 0.058 
Notes: All regressions include session fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See notes of Table 1 for definitions 







Table 3: SUR Estimates: Personality Traits 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 







        
SCST -0.202** -0.228*** -0.250*** -0.049 -0.254*** -0.211** -0.279*** 
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.089) (0.086) (0.088) (0.088) 
OBC -0.040 -0.264*** 0.039 0.010 -0.192** -0.018 -0.158** 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.079) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) 
Female 0.260*** 0.089* 0.128** -0.210*** 0.042 -0.074 0.184*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Age -0.016 -0.019 0.017 -0.010 0.016 0.037 -0.011 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Hindu -0.175** 0.035 -0.042 -0.237*** -0.072 -0.024 -0.120 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.087) (0.087) (0.084) (0.087) (0.086) 
Private School -0.070 0.128** -0.069 -0.047 0.041 -0.107* -0.086 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
High socioeconomic status 0.042 -0.021 -0.129** -0.005 0.051 -0.089 -0.012 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
Raven's test score 0.023 0.083*** -0.021 0.031 0.103*** 0.033 0.021 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 0.427 0.311 0.143 0.662 -0.032 -0.179 0.677 
 (0.624) (0.618) (0.629) (0.631) (0.613) (0.628) (0.627) 
        
H0:  SCST = OBC  
(p-value) 2.9 (0.09) 0.15 (0.7) 9.12 (0.002) 0.38 (0.54) 0.45 (0.5) 4.08 (0.04) 1.61 (0.2) 
Observations 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 
R-squared 0.067 0.081 0.059 0.053 0.073 0.065 0.078 
Notes: All regressions include session fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See notes of Table 1 for definitions of right-hand side variables. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 4: SUR Estimates: Differences in Behavioral Preferences by Socioeconomic Status 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Competitiveness Confidence Risk Preference Egalitarianism 
     
SCST -0.075 -0.072 0.388 0.091** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (2.007) (0.039) 
OBC -0.055 0.059 0.223 0.102*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (1.966) (0.038) 
High SES 0.042 0.004 0.285 -0.004 
 (0.034) (0.035) (1.383) (0.027) 
High SES x SCST -0.018 0.013 -0.010 -0.038 
 (0.068) (0.069) (2.779) (0.053) 
High SES x OBC -0.042 -0.058 -0.159 -0.082* 
 (0.062) (0.063) (2.541) (0.049) 
Constant 0.655** 0.388 49.627*** 0.269 
 (0.266) (0.273) (10.947) (0.210) 
     
Observations 1,918 1,918 1,918 1,918 
R-squared 0.107 0.064 0.080 0.059 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other controls include age, gender, religion, private school, Raven’s test score, 
and session fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 5: SUR Estimates: Differences in Personality Traits by Socioeconomic Status 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 







        
SCST -0.227* -0.064 -0.230* -0.177 -0.209* -0.335*** -0.260** 
 (0.119) (0.117) (0.119) (0.120) (0.116) (0.119) (0.119) 
OBC -0.087 -0.130 -0.015 -0.132 -0.183 -0.205* -0.115 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) (0.117) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) 
High SES 0.018 0.078 -0.141* -0.095 0.069 -0.192** 0.009 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081) 
High SES x SCST 0.036 -0.320* -0.071 0.233 -0.101 0.204 -0.026 
 (0.167) (0.165) (0.168) (0.168) (0.164) (0.167) (0.168) 
High SES x OBC 0.080 -0.199 0.108 0.226 -0.002 0.311** -0.074 
 (0.149) (0.147) (0.150) (0.150) (0.146) (0.149) (0.149) 
Constant 0.437 0.178 0.099 0.751 -0.080 -0.113 0.672 
 (0.629) (0.622) (0.633) (0.635) (0.617) (0.631) (0.632) 
        
Observations 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 
R-squared 0.067 0.084 0.060 0.055 0.073 0.067 0.079 





Table 6: SUR Estimates: Differences in Behavioral Preferences by Private School 
Enrollment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Competitiveness Confidence Risk 
Preference 
Egalitarianism 
     
SCST -0.126*** -0.085* 0.093 0.039 
 (0.047) (0.048) (1.939) (0.037) 
OBC -0.067 -0.008 -1.935 0.042 
 (0.049) (0.051) (2.037) (0.039) 
Private School -0.064* -0.042 0.510 0.047* 
 (0.033) (0.034) (1.361) (0.026) 
Private school x SCST 0.102 0.015 -0.285 0.060 
 (0.068) (0.070) (2.809) (0.054) 
Private school x OBC -0.027 0.060 3.464 0.017 
 (0.061) (0.063) (2.509) (0.048) 
Constant 0.666** 0.387 50.060*** 0.287 
 (0.264) (0.272) (10.883) (0.209) 
     
Observations 1,918 1,918 1,918 1,918 
R-squared 0.108 0.064 0.081 0.058 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other controls include age, gender, religion, high socioeconomic status, 

















Table 7: SUR Estimates: Differences in Personality Traits by Private School Enrollment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 







        
SCST -0.361*** -0.233** -0.326*** -0.253** -0.338*** -0.334*** -0.262** 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) (0.117) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) 
OBC -0.148 -0.192 -0.126 -0.128 -0.382*** -0.159 -0.162 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.115) (0.118) (0.118) 
Private School -0.159** 0.149* -0.148* -0.161** -0.048 -0.194** -0.081 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080) 
Private school x SCST 0.339** 0.047 0.110 0.434*** 0.116 0.235 -0.044 
 (0.167) (0.165) (0.168) (0.168) (0.164) (0.168) (0.168) 
Private school x OBC 0.153 -0.129 0.273* 0.198 0.315** 0.220 0.011 
 (0.147) (0.146) (0.148) (0.148) (0.144) (0.148) (0.148) 
Constant 0.485 0.289 0.205 0.737 0.039 -0.117 0.676 
 (0.624) (0.619) (0.629) (0.630) (0.613) (0.628) (0.628) 
        
Observations 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 
R-squared 0.070 0.082 0.061 0.057 0.075 0.066 0.078 
     Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other controls include age, gender, religion, high socioeconomic status, Raven’s test score, and session fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10.
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Table A1: Correlation Matrix of Residuals for Behavioral Preferences 
 Competitiveness Confidence Risk Preference Egalitarianism 
Competitiveness 1.00    
Confidence 0.0945 1.00   
Risk Preference 0.0714 0.0534 1.00  
Egalitarianism -0.0782 -0.0423 -0.0659 1.00 
Breusch-Pagan test of 























Agreeableness 1.00       
Extraversion -0.086 1.00      
Conscientiousness 0.155 -0.069 1.00     
Emotional 
stability 
0.196 -0.002 0.130 1.00    
Openness to 
experience 
0.088 0.239 0.103 0.033 1.00   
Locus of Control 0.071 0.037 0.049 0.079 0.091 1.00  







































Table A3: SUR Estimates: Differences in Behavioral Preferences by Gender 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Competitiveness Confidence Risk Preference Egalitarianism 
     
SCST -0.091** -0.088** 0.312 0.086*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (1.726) (0.033) 
OBC -0.087** -0.001 -0.447 0.065** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (1.595) (0.031) 
Female -0.176*** -0.114*** -6.508*** 0.016 
 (0.025) (0.026) (1.032) (0.020) 
Female x SCST 0.011 0.038 -0.180 -0.067 
 (0.071) (0.073) (2.912) (0.056) 
Female x OBC 0.024 0.086 1.797 -0.023 
 (0.063) (0.065) (2.613) (0.050) 
Constant 0.654** 0.355 49.167*** 0.286 
 (0.265) (0.272) (10.897) (0.210) 
     
Observations 1,918 1,918 1,918 1,918 
R-squared 0.106 0.064 0.080 0.058 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other controls include age, religion, private school, high socioeconomic 




Table A4: SUR Estimates: Differences in Personality Traits by Gender 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 







        
SCST -0.263** -0.276*** -0.281*** -0.067 -0.308*** -0.273*** -0.258** 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.101) (0.104) (0.104) 
OBC -0.061 -0.288*** -0.024 -0.071 -0.223** -0.043 -0.102 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) 
Female 0.236*** 0.068 0.098 -0.243*** 0.017 -0.099* 0.209*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) 
Female x SCST 0.190 0.146 0.068 0.017 0.159 0.190 -0.039 
 (0.170) (0.168) (0.171) (0.172) (0.167) (0.171) (0.171) 
Female x OBC 0.038 0.054 0.182 0.244 0.073 0.052 -0.163 
 (0.153) (0.151) (0.154) (0.154) (0.150) (0.154) (0.154) 
Constant 0.411 0.292 0.091 0.594 -0.057 -0.199 0.724 
 (0.625) (0.620) (0.630) (0.632) (0.614) (0.629) (0.628) 
        
Observations 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 
R-squared 0.068 0.082 0.060 0.054 0.073 0.065 0.079 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other controls include age, religion, private school, high socioeconomic status, Raven’s test score, and session fixed effects. *** 





Table A5: OLS/LPM Estimates: Behavioral Preferences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Competitiveness Confidence Risk Preference Egalitarian 
     
SCST -0.088** -0.075** 0.409 0.061** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (1.444) (0.029) 
OBC -0.069** 0.044 0.151 0.054** 
 (0.032) (0.035) (1.419) (0.027) 
Constant 0.651** 0.286 47.438*** 0.281 
 (0.269) (0.279) (12.268) (0.201) 
     
Observations 1,966 1,970 1,965 1,948 
R-squared 0.105 0.061 0.077 0.058 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other controls include age, gender, religion, private school, high 







Table A6: OLS Estimates: Personality Traits 
 
















        
SCST -0.178** -0.242*** -0.175** 0.005 -0.324*** -0.184** -0.256*** 
 (0.085) (0.078) (0.083) (0.082) (0.078) (0.077) (0.075) 
OBC -0.020 -0.275*** 0.004 0.028 -0.240*** 0.002 -0.163** 
 (0.075) (0.069) (0.073) (0.070) (0.073) (0.067) (0.072) 
Constant 0.331 0.436 0.080 0.886 0.265 0.095 0.454 
 (0.631) (0.571) (0.576) (0.622) (0.576) (0.577) (0.600) 
        
Observations 1,896 1,904 1,921 1,917 1,925 1,847 1,886 
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.048 0.045 0.064 0.060 0.069 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other controls include age, gender, religion, private school, high 
socioeconomic status, Raven’s test score, and session fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 




Table A7: Multiple Hypothesis Testing: Behavioral Preferences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Competitiveness Confidence Risk Preference Egalitarian 
     
Low caste -0.077*** -0.006 0.258 0.057** 
 (0.006) (0.838) (0.827) (0.011) 
 [0.023] [0.722] [0.722] [0.023] 
Constant 0.652** 0.289 47.434*** 0.281 
 (0.015) (0.296) (0.000) (0.163) 
     
Observations 1,966 1,970 1,965 1,948 
R-squared 0.105 0.057 0.077 0.058 
G -2.75   8.012 
E* -0.118   0.063 
Notes: Low caste takes a value 1 if caste is SCST or OBC, 0 otherwise. The coefficients are marginal effects from OLS 
regressions. Other controls include age, gender, religion, private school, high socioeconomic status, Raven’s test score, 
and session fixed effects. Unadjusted p-values are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Multiple 
hypothesis corrected sharpened q-values in square brackets. The lower panel reports G and E* based on the test prescribed 







Table A8: Multiple Hypothesis Testing: Personality Traits 
 
















        
Low caste -0.085 -0.261*** -0.070 0.018 -0.275*** -0.075 -0.203*** 
 (0.197) (0.000) (0.272) (0.771) (0.000) (0.211) (0.001) 
 [0.204] [0.001] [0.222] [0.42] [0.001] [0.204] [0.002] 
Constant 0.353 0.432 0.092 0.890 0.273 0.111 0.469 
 (0.580) (0.450) (0.874) (0.153) (0.637) (0.846) (0.434) 
        
Observations 1,896 1,904 1,921 1,917 1,925 1,847 1,886 
R-squared 0.065 0.066 0.046 0.045 0.064 0.057 0.069 
G  1.769   2.237  2.173 
E*  -0.174   -0.234  -0.152 
Notes: Low caste takes a value 1 if caste is SCST or OBC, 0 otherwise. The coefficients are marginal effects from OLS 
regressions. Other controls include age, gender, religion, private school, high socioeconomic status, Raven’s test score, and 
session fixed effects. Unadjusted p-values are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Multiple 
hypothesis corrected sharpened q-values in square brackets. The lower panel reports G and E* based on the test prescribed by 
Oster (2016), with maximum R-squared set at 1.3 times the R-squared from the regressions using controls. 
 
